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THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Stephen M. Johnson* 
Abstract: During the October 2008 Term, the Supreme Court decided 
five cases that raised issues of environmental law and the environment was 
the loser in each case. While it may be difficult to characterize the deci-
sions of the Roberts Court, generally, as “pro-environment” or “anti-
environment,” a couple themes consistently appear in the Court’s deci-
sions. First, in most of the environmental cases, the Court has adopted a 
position advocated or defended by a federal, state or local government 
when governmental interests are at issue. Second, in all of the cases that 
implicate federalism concerns, the Court has rendered decisions that fa-
vor States’ rights, regardless of whether the decisions are beneficial to, or 
harmful to, the environment. Finally, while the Court continues to rely 
primarily on textualism to interpret statutes, the Court has not relied on 
textualism to support its decisions in most of the cases that have been 
harmful to the environment. 
Introduction 
 It is a familiar refrain. According to many academics, the Supreme 
Court does not treat environmental law as a unique area of law, but 
treats environmental cases as administrative law, statutory law, or consti-
tutional law cases that merely arise in the context of environmental dis-
putes.1 Consequently, the Court has been viewed as “irrelevant” in de-
veloping environmental law2 or environmental policy or, worse yet, hos-
tile to the environment.3 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2010, Stephen M. Johnson, Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School 
of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D., Villanova University; LL.M., George Washington Uni-
versity School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in 
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 703, 706, 737 (2000); Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Ste-
vens, Judicial Power, and the Varieties of Environmental Litigation, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1963, 
1965 (2006); Jay D. Wexler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 260, 266–67 (2006). 
2 See Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in En-
vironmental Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 548 (1997). 
3 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 705; see also Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judi-
cial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 
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 Professor Richard Lazarus has suggested that his analysis of the vot-
ing patterns of Justices in environmental cases over thirty years, and the 
nature of the Court’s opinions in environmental cases, demonstrate the 
Court’s increasing hostility.4 Professor Albert Lin echoed Professor La-
zarus’ claim that the Court is hostile to the environment, and asserted 
that his review of the Court’s decisions in the October 2003 term dem-
onstrated that the Justices relied on textualism and the selective applica-
tion of federalism to obscure an underlying anti-environment bias.5 
 Several commentators have suggested that the unique nature of 
environmental law calls for a different approach from the Court. They 
urge the Court to consider the unique features of environmental dis-
putes when applying general principles of law to the facts in those cases 
and to shape general principles of law, in part, based on lessons learned 
in the context of environmental disputes.6 This article examines the 
environmental decisions from the first four terms of the Roberts Court 
to make some initial observations regarding whether the Court appears 
hostile to the environment and whether it is treating environmental law 
as a unique body of law. 
 While the October 2008 Term was particularly harsh for the envi-
ronment, the Roberts Court, over four terms, has not been overtly hos-
tile to the environment, although the Justices seem to be more polar-
ized in environmental cases and the Courts’ decisions, on the whole, 
could probably be more harmful to the environment than beneficial.7 A 
review of the Roberts Courts’ environmental decisions suggests that, for 
the most part, the Court continues to treat environmental cases as ad-
ministrative, statutory, or constitutional law cases that merely arise in the 
context of environmental disputes.8 Surprisingly, though, some of the 
Court’s opinions have been peppered with pro-environment rhetoric.9 
 While it may be difficult to characterize the environmental deci-
sions of the Roberts Court as a whole as “pro-environment” or “anti-
environment,” a couple themes consistently appear in the Court’s reso-
lution of those cases. First, in most of the environmental cases that the 
Court has heard, it has adopted a position advocated or defended by a 
                                                                                                                      
343, 346 (1989); Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme 
Court’s 2003–04 Term, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 565, 565–66, 632 (2005). 
4 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 706–07, 771. 
5 See Lin, supra note 3, at 567–68. 
6 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 740–41; Wexler, supra note 1, at 264. 
7 See infra notes 90–105 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 112–68 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 198–211 and accompanying text. 
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federal, state, or local government when governmental interests are at 
issue.10 As the author of this article noted in a previous article, the Rob-
erts Court appears to adopt a very deferential, “pro-government” ap-
proach in environmental cases, and other cases.11 Second, in all of the 
environmental cases that implicate federalism concerns, the Court has 
rendered decisions that are in favor of States’ rights, regardless of 
whether the decisions are pro-environment or anti-environment.12 If 
the Court were applying federalism selectively to advance anti-environ-
ment policies in the years before the Roberts Court, as Professor Lin 
suggested, the Roberts Court does not appear to be continuing that 
trend.13 Federalism concerns are being raised and upheld consistently 
in environmental cases.14 Finally, while the Court continues to rely pri-
marily on textualism to interpret statutes, the Court did not rely on tex-
tualism to support its decisions in most of the anti-environment cases.15 
On the contrary, in many of the Court’s pro-environment decisions, the 
Court relied on the plain meaning of the environmental laws to resolve 
the cases.16 
 The following section of this Article, Part I, outlines the criticisms 
of the Supreme Court’s treatment of “environmental law” prior to the 
Roberts Term, focusing on the work of Professors Daniel Farber, Rich-
ard Lazarus, and Albert Lin. Part II of the Article explores the environ-
mental decisions of the first four terms of the Roberts Court and draws 
some preliminary conclusions from them. Part III of the Article re-
examines those environmental decisions in light of the criticisms raised 
by professors Farber and Lazarus to the Court’s environmental juris-
prudence in the years prior to the Roberts Court. Finally, Part IV briefly 
explores whether the ascendancy of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, to replace 
Justice David Souter, may influence the Court’s decision-making in envi-
ronmental cases. 
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra notes 112–27 and accompanying text. 
11 See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?): Justice 
Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1 
(2007). 
12 See infra notes 112–24 and accompanying text. 
13 See Lin, supra note 3, at 619. 
14 See infra notes 112–24 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text. 
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I. Environmental Law: There’s No “There” There 
 Academics have frequently asserted that the Supreme Court has 
not treated environmental law as a distinct area of law in the same way 
that the Court has treated civil rights law and other substantive areas of 
law as distinct.17 While some have suggested that the Court’s decisions 
have been irrelevant in shaping environmental law and policy,18 others 
are concerned that the Court’s failure to recognize the unique nature 
of environmental issues has resulted in a Court that is hostile to envi-
ronmental concerns.19 
 Professor Daniel Farber is in the first camp. Based on his review of 
the Court’s environmental jurisprudence, Farber concluded that the 
Court’s decisions “have not substantially affected environmental regula-
tion” and that the Court has been “largely irrelevant” since the late 
1970s.20 Farber asserts that the Court has minimized its influence on 
the development of environmental law in several important ways: (1) by 
choosing to hear cases that have “little precedential value” because they 
involve insignificant issues or have peculiar facts;21 (2) by dismissing 
many cases on jurisdictional grounds and avoiding deciding cases on 
the merits;22 and (3) by resolving issues on narrow, technical grounds 
or deferring to agency decisions when the Court addresses the merits 
in environmental cases.23 Farber notes a general trend in the Court’s 
environmental jurisprudence towards limiting the Court’s power in fa-
                                                                                                                      
17 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 706, 737, 766; Manaster, supra note 1, at 1965; Wex-
ler, supra note 1, at 260–62. 
18 See Farber, supra note 2, at 547–48. 
19 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 705, 706–07; see also Levy & Glicksman, supra note 3, at 
346, 421; Lin, supra note 3, at 567–68. 
20 See Farber, supra note 2, at 547–48. Farber recognizes that the key policy decisions 
for environmental law should be made by Congress or agencies, but he argues that the 
Court “could help provide direction in interpreting environmental statutes, improve the 
process by which lower courts review agency decisions, integrate innovative environmental 
statutes into the general body of existing law, and provide leadership in those significant 
policy areas that Congress has left to the judiciary rather than the EPA.” Id. at 548. 
21 Id. at 569. Accordingly, Farber laments that the Court has allowed important areas 
of environmental law to “languish in obscurity,” and has made little contribution to several 
areas that “provide the bulk of litigation in environmental law,” such as officer and share-
holder liability, dischargeability of future Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) claims in bankruptcy, and lender liability and con-
tribution in CERCLA. Id. at 552–53. 
22 Farber notes that the Court has frequently avoided deciding cases on the merits by re-
stricting standing for environmental plaintiffs. Id. at 555–56 (discussing Lujan v. Nat’l Wild-
life Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)). 
23 Id. at 558–59 (discussing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 
(1978) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
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vor of the legislative and executive branches.24 While Farber believes 
that the Court has not played a significant role in the development of 
environmental law, he suggests that there are several directions that the 
Court might take in the future in environmental cases. At the extremes, 
he suggests that the Court might continue to be irrelevant25 or that 
“the Court might embark on a course of judicial activism, crusading for 
(or more likely against) environmentalism.”26 Alternatively, he posits 
that the Court might act as the “legislature’s junior partner,” resolving 
the questions that Congress does not answer and that agencies cannot 
answer, and integrating environmental legislation into the existing 
body of law.27 More pessimistically, he suggests that the Court might act 
as an “immune system,” subsuming environmental law within the exist-
ing legal regime and limiting changes in legal concepts as applied to 
environmental matters beyond changes expressly mandated by Con-
gress.28 
 Like Professor Farber, Professor Kenneth Manaster has concluded 
that the Supreme Court has not been instrumental in developing a 
separate field of “environmental law.”29 Manaster notes that the Court 
resolves most “environmental cases through general doctrines of ad-
ministrative law and statutory interpretation,” rather than through 
“specific environmental principles and policies.”30 Reviewing Justice 
Stevens’s opinions in environmental cases, Manaster suggests that the 
Court could play a greater role in crafting “environmental law” in cases 
involving direct enforcement of environmental statutes or judicial re-
view of agency action under environmental statutes.31 
 Professors Richard Lazarus and Albert Lin are more pessimistic 
about the role that the Court has taken in shaping environmental law 
and both see the Court as increasingly hostile to environmental con-
cerns. Based on his review of more than 240 Supreme Court decisions, 
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. at 556–60. 
25 Id. at 563. 
26 Farber, supra note 2, at 563. Regarding activism, Farber argues that “[a]n effort by 
the courts to usurp the leadership of the political branches would be at best unproductive 
and at worst a fiasco.” Id. 
27 Id. at 564–65. In particular, he suggests that the Court could help resolve issues 
about how to allocate responsibility in CERCLA cases for environmental harm and how to 
address questions about causation in toxic tort cases. Id. 
28 Id. at 566. Although he does not ultimately forecast which direction the Court will 
take, he notes that an “ineffective court . . . can accomplish nothing, for good or for evil.” 
Id. at 569. 
29 See Manaster, supra note 1, at 1965. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1966–67. 
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Professor Lazarus concluded that the Justices perceive environmental 
law as “merely an incidental factual context” and do not recognize that 
the nature of the environmental concerns is relevant to their resolution 
of the legal issues in the cases.32 Consequently, he asserts that the 
Court’s indifference and hostility towards environmental law frustrates 
environmental protection goals, “resulting in substantial losses in envi-
ronmental quality and public health and welfare.”33 
 Professor Lazarus bases his conclusions on a review of the voting 
patterns of Justices in environmental cases, the identity of Justices writ-
ing opinions in environmental cases, and the nature of those opinions. 
First, Professor Lazarus notes that while Justice White wrote the most 
majority opinions in environmental cases decided by the Court,34 his 
dispassionate, dry, formalistic opinions do not exhibit any environ-
mental ethic and do not suggest that the environmental dimension of 
the cases played any independent role in the Court’s decisionmaking 
or reasoning.35 The lack of an environmental voice or rhetoric is a 
trend that he asserts runs throughout the majority opinions in most of 
the environmental cases by all of the Justices.36 Absent in the rulings is 
any “emphasis on the nature, character, and normative weightiness of 
environmental protection concerns and their import for judicial con-
struction of relevant legal rules.”37 As Professor Lazarus suggests, “the 
only passionate rhetorical flourishes evident in environmental cases are 
those penned by Justice Scalia. And they do not trumpet the impor-
tance of environmental protection; they question it.”38 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 706, 708. 
33 Id. at 706–07. 
34 Id. at 709. During the period reviewed by Professor Lazarus, commencing with the 
October Term in 1969 and concluding with the October Term in 1998, Justice White wrote 
thirty-six environmental opinions. Id. The next closest Justice during that time period, 
Justice O’Connor, only wrote twenty-two opinions. Id. 
35 See id. at 710–11. Professor Lazarus wrote that Justice White’s opinions “do not re-
flect any deliberation regarding the special demands that environmental protection may 
place on law and lawmaking institutions” and “[n]or, similarly, do his opinions display any 
discernible effort to discern and consider how the interests of future generations in envi-
ronmental protection may warrant consideration in the law’s evolution.” Id. at 711. 
36 Id. at 737. In a separate article, Professor Kenneth Manaster notes that Justice Wil-
liam O. Douglas, who retired in 1975, wrote passionate opinions on environmental issues 
and that no Justice, including Justice Stevens, who replaced him, has emerged as an heir to 
his legacy. See Manaster, supra note 1, at 1964. 
37 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 737. 
38 Id. at 739. 
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 Professor Lazarus also notes that while Justice Kennedy voted in 
the majority in environmental cases more than any other Justice,39 and, 
consequently influences the Court more than any other Justice on envi-
ronmental matters, he has written very few opinions in those cases.40 
Thus, as Lazarus points out, “[t]he most significant vote has had little 
to no direct expression in the Court’s opinion writing” and “[t]he up-
shot is the exacerbation of the Court’s longstanding lack of environ-
mental voice.”41 
 Most significantly, though, Professor Lazarus bases his conclusion 
that the Court is becoming increasingly hostile to the environment on 
his analysis of the voting patterns of the Justices. When he engages in a 
qualitative and anecdotal review of the Justices’ voting, Professor Laza-
rus concludes that the evidence suggests that most of the Justices were 
not influenced by the environmental context of the cases.42 He illus-
trates how several seemingly pro-environment Justices have authored or 
joined anti-environment decisions and vice versa.43 However, Professor 
Lazarus moves beyond a qualitative review of the Justices voting and 
engages in a quantitative review of the Justices, assigning each an envi-
ronmental protection (EP) score based on the frequency with which 
they have voted in favor of the environment in their decisions in envi-
ronmental cases.44 Based on his review of the EP scores, he concludes 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. at 714–15. Professor Lazarus indicated that, other than an original action involv-
ing an interstate water compact, Justice Kennedy dissented in only one case, Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), of the fifty-seven environmental cases in which he par-
ticipated and that the Court later overruled the decision in that case. See Lazarus, supra 
note 1, at 714–15. Thus, he notes that Justice Kennedy voted with the majority more than 
ninety-six percent of the time. Id. at 713. Professor Lazarus updated his findings in a later 
article to include decisions of the October 1999 and 2000 terms, and Justice Kennedy only 
dissented one more time during those terms. See Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and 
the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 653, 656 (2002). 
40 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 715. During the time period that Professor Lazarus re-
viewed, Justice Kennedy only wrote four majority opinions, with half of those coming dur-
ing the October 1998 Term. See id. He wrote an additional two opinions during the Octo-
ber 1999 and 2000 terms. See Lazarus, supra note 39, at 656. 
41 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 715. 
42 Id. at 716. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at 718–22. Professor Lazarus selected 100 of the 240 environmental Supreme 
Court decisions that more readily lent themselves to a designation as a pro-environmental 
or anti-environmental decision for scoring purposes. Id. He assigned each Justice one 
point for each pro-environmental outcome for which they voted and the final score (“EP 
score”) for each Justice was based on the percentage of pro-environmental votes that the 
Justice cast in the 100 cases that Professor Lazarus reviewed. Id. Professor Lazarus ac-
knowledges that a scoring system like his could be arbitrary because many cases may not 
lend themselves to pro-environmental and anti-environmental labels. Id. He attempts to 
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that for some Justices, the environmental context of a case did influ-
ence their voting.45 In addition, he concludes that some Justices are 
becoming increasingly anti-environmental.46 
 While Professor Lazarus recognizes that it is hard to draw fine dis-
tinctions between Justices based on their EP scores, he suggests that 
some conclusions can be drawn regarding Justices who have scores at 
the very high end or low end of the scale.47 Specifically, he asserts that 
“[a] fair case” can be made that the environmental protection dimen-
sion of cases influenced a Justice if the Justice’s score is greater than 
sixty-six (meaning that they supported the pro-environment position in 
sixty-six percent or more of the cases) or less than thirty-three (mean-
ing that they supported the pro-environment position in thirty-three 
percent or less of the cases), and that “a strong case” can be made if the 
Justice’s score is greater than seventy-five or less than twenty-five.48 Re-
viewing the EP scores, Professor Lazarus noted that none of the sitting 
Justices at the time scored higher than sixty-six, while Justices Scalia 
(13.8), Thomas (20) and Kennedy (25.9) all scored lower than thirty-
three.49 His analysis of the EP scores also formed the basis for his asser-
tion that the Court, as a whole, is becoming less responsive to environ-
mental protection.50 Specifically, he noted that in 1975, there were no 
Justices with an EP score of twenty or lower, only one Justice with a 
score of thirty-three or lower, and one Justice with a score over sixty-
six.51 By 1999, though, there were two Justices with a score of twenty or 
lower, four Justices with a score of thirty-three or lower, and no Justices 
with a score over sixty-six.52 
 Professor Lazarus is concerned about the Court’s indifference or 
hostility towards environmental law because the nature of the injury in 
                                                                                                                      
account for that concern by focusing only on the 100 of 240 cases that can be character-
ized as pro-environmental or anti-environmental. Id. at 723. 
45 Id. at 716. 
46 Id. at 737. 
47 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 723. Professor Lazarus admits that in many cases, whether 
an “outcome happened to be more or less environmentally protective had little . . . impact 
on an individual Justice’s decision to vote one way rather than another.” Id. at 722. Never-
theless, while Professor Lazarus recognizes that conclusions should not be drawn from 
small differences in scores, he suggests that “for those few Justices with scores either very 
high or very low, it is at least plausible to theorize that the environmental protection di-
mension influenced their vote one way or the other.” Id. at 723. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 724–27, 812 app. D. 
50 See id. at 736–37. 
51 Id. at 735. 
52 Id. 
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environmental cases is unique,53 and because he believes that the 
Court’s analysis of the law in the cases should be informed by, and re-
spond to, the unique character of the injury.54 He contends that envi-
ronmental considerations should inform the development of other ar-
eas of law55 or, at a minimum, the Court should consider the unique 
issues raised by environmental disputes when applying other areas of law 
in the environmental context.56 
 Professor Albert Lin also believes that the Court is becoming in-
creasingly hostile to environmental law and bases his conclusions on an 
analysis of the Court’s decisions during the 2003–2004 Term, as well as 
prior environmental jurisprudence.57 The Court decided an unusually 
high number of cases involving the environment and natural resources 
during that Term and the decisions “generally resulted in the weaken-
ing of environmental law.”58 Reviewing the cases, Lin concludes that 
the decisions “continue a trend in the gradual but discernible erosion 
of environmental law and of governmental authority to address envi-
ronmental concerns.”59 
 Reviewing the seven cases decided by the Court during the Term, 
Professor Lin observed that all of the cases involved questions of statu-
tory interpretation, none posed fundamental constitutional questions, 
and all of the cases had been decided in favor of the environmental 
interests below.60 Professor Lin suggested that the Court’s selection of 
cases implied “a skepticism . . . of lower court rulings favorable to envi-
ronmentalists.”61 More generally, he asserted that the court eroded en-
vironmental law through the use of (1) textualism; (2) importation of 
common law causation analysis into statutory schemes; and (3) the se-
lective invocation of federalism principles to inform statutory interpre-
tation.62 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 744–48. Professor Lazarus suggests that the injuries ad-
dressed in environmental law are unique because they are often (1) irreversible, catastro-
phic, and continuing; (2) physically distant; (3) temporally distant; (4) enveloped by un-
certainty and risk; (5) caused by multiple sources; and (6) non-economic and non-human. 
Id. 
54 Id. at 756. 
55 See id. at 740–41. 
56 Id. at 741. 
57 See Lin, supra note 3, at 567–69. 
58 Id. at 567. 
59 Id. at 568. 
60 Id. at 570. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 568. 
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 First, Professor Lin observed that the Court increasingly relies on 
textualism in interpreting statutes and that, in at least two of the cases, 
the Court used textualism to interpret environmental statutes in a man-
ner that was contrary to legislative intent.63 This is particularly troubling 
because, as Lin notes, Justices often mask their policy choices in neutral 
terms when purporting to interpret a statute according to its plain 
meaning.64 He suggests that textualist Justices disguise anti-regulatory 
environmental policy choices by (1) interpreting statutes narrowly, with-
out regard to the purposes of the statute;65 (2) deferring less frequently 
to agency interpretations, again thereby ignoring the policy concerns 
considered by the agencies;66 and (3) ignoring legislative history.67 
 After examining the impact of textualism on the Court’s environ-
mental decisions during the 2003 Term, Professor Lin argued that the 
Court narrowed the scope of environmental regulation in three cases 
in a manner that was, to some extent, inconsistent with textualism, by 
importing proximate cause analysis into the statute.68 
 Finally, Professor Lin asserted that the Court selectively adopted or 
rejected federalism arguments in a manner that limited environmental 
protection.69 Specifically, Lin noted that three of the environmental 
cases decided that term involved a conflict between federal and state 
regulatory authority and presented opportunities for the Court to ex-
pand its federalism jurisprudence.70 Reviewing the cases, though, he 
asserted that “no obvious federalism theme . . . emerged. Collectively, 
these three decisions instead support the thesis that members of the 
Court voice federalism concerns inconsistently and opportunistically.”71 
 While Professor Lin concludes that the Court is eroding environ-
mental law, he does not assert that the Court is engaging in judicial ac-
                                                                                                                      
63 Lin, supra note 3, at 580–81. 
64 Id. at 580. Lin also discussed Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) as an example of a decision where the Court used a 
textualist approach to reach a conclusion that was at odds with the purposes of a statute. 
Id. at 595–98. 
65 Id. at 601–03. 
66 Id. at 603–04. 
67 Id. at 604–05. 
68 Id. at 618–19. 
69 Lin, supra note 3, at 626. 
70 Id. at 619. Professor Lin identified Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. 
EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004); Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management 
District, 541 U.S. 246 (2004); and South Florida Water Management District. v. Miccosukee Tribe 
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) as cases involving conflicts between state and federal regula-
tory authority. See id. 
71 Id. at 626. 
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tivism in the environmental arena. Instead, he concludes that the Court 
is adopting what Professor Farber described as the “Court as an immune 
system” approach, utilizing other tools of legal analysis to subsume envi-
ronmental regulation within the existing legal order.72 Ultimately, he 
asserts that the Court is subverting environmental law and that “[e]x-
posing the political nature and consequences of their actions is the first 
step in holding the Court accountable and in ultimately combating the 
subversion.”73 
 Professor Jay Wexler does not conclude that the Court is hostile to 
the environment, but he agrees with Professor Lazarus, Professor Lin, 
and others that the Court is not recognizing the unique nature of envi-
ronmental law.74 His recommendations for the direction that the Court 
should take in environmental cases echo the recommendations of Pro-
fessor Lazarus that are outlined above. In a recent article, Professor 
Wexler examines seven paradigms that federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, could take when deciding environmental cases.75 He 
ultimately concludes that because of the unique nature of environ-
mental law, courts should not “apply generally applicable legal princi-
ples without any special concern for the environmental aspects of the 
case.”76 Instead, he urges that “courts should consider the distinctive 
features of ecological injury when applying facts to law, and . . . should 
draw on their knowledge of those distinctive features when fashioning 
rules of general application.”77 
 Most of the literature that critiques the Supreme Court’s impact 
on the development of a unique body of “environmental law” examines 
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 634. 
73 Id. at 635. 
74 See Wexler, supra note 1, at 260–62. 
75 Id. at 262–63. Wexler suggests that courts might: 
(1) supplant generally applicable principles from other areas of law with princi-
ples applicable only to environmental law; (2) retain general principles from 
other areas of law but apply them in a special manner in environmental law cas-
es; (3) shape general principles of law through an understanding of environ-
mental problems; (4) pay strong attention to the factual nuances of environ-
mental problems when applying facts to general principles of law; (5) apply 
general principles of law to environmental law problems but employ environ-
ment-related rhetoric or provide advice relating to environmental protection; 
(6) decide environmental law cases on the basis of preferred outcomes regard-
ing the environment; or (7) apply generally applicable legal principles without 
any special concern for the environmental aspects of the case. 
Id. 
76 Id. at 263. 
77 Id. at 264. 
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the decisions of the Court prior to the ascendancy of Chief Justice Rob-
erts. The remainder of this Article explores whether the environmental 
decisions of the Roberts Court follow the trends outlined above. Al-
though the Roberts Court has only completed four terms, at least one 
other academic, Professor Jonathan Adler, has already expressed some 
preliminary opinions regarding the Court’s decisions in environmental 
cases.78 
 Instead of focusing on whether the Court is hostile to the envi-
ronment or is creating a unique body of “environmental law,” though, 
Professor Adler reviewed sixteen “environmental law” decisions from 
the first four terms of the Roberts Court to explore whether the Court 
was adopting a “pro-business” approach in those cases.79 In the same 
way that Professor Lazarus recognized that classifying cases as “pro-
environment” and “anti-environment” is often difficult, Professor Adler 
pointed out that business interests are often opposed in environmental 
disputes, so it is often difficult to classify decisions as “pro-business” or 
“anti-business.”80 Nevertheless, Adler determined that it was possible to 
identify the position that is supported by the balance of business inter-
ests, and that produces a rule that on the whole works to the benefit of 
business in all of the cases. He concluded that the decisions did not 
show a “pro-business” bias or orientation.81 Specifically, he found that 
the Court adopted a “pro-business” position in only eight of the sixteen 
cases that he reviewed.82 More importantly, he noted that most of the 
“pro-business” decisions occurred in narrow cases that had little effect 
on pre-existing law, while the decisions that harmed businesses were 
quite dramatic and will have profound effects on economic interests.83 
He also stressed that the nature of the Court’s decisions is important in 
determining whether the Court is “pro-business” or “anti-business.”84 
Specifically, he suggested that cases in which the Court adopts a pro-
business interpretation of a statute, which can be overridden by Con-
                                                                                                                      
78 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Pre-
liminary Assessment, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 943 (2009) (exploring whether the Roberts 
Court is actually “pro-business” through the lens of environmental law). 
79 Id. at 952–53. 
80 Id. at 952. 
81 Id. at 953. More generally, though, he admitted that the Roberts Court could be 
“called ‘pro-business’ insofar as it is sympathetic to some basic business-oriented legal 
claims, it reads statutes narrowly, it resists finding implied causes of action,” and “it does 
not place its finger on the scales to assist non-business litigants.” Id. at 951. 
82 Id. at 953. 
83 Id. at 954. 
84 See Adler, supra note 78, at 950. 
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gress, are less significant than cases in which the Court announces a 
substantive rule of constitutional law that benefits businesses.85 
 While Adler did not find a “pro-business” bent to the Roberts 
Court’s environmental decisions, he suggested that the Court may have 
a “pro-government” bent, as the Court ruled in favor of the govern-
ment in more than two-thirds of the cases in which government inter-
ests were at stake.86 Part II of this Article examines many of those same 
cases to assess whether the Roberts Court is hostile to the environment 
and to explore factors that may be influencing the Court in environ-
mental cases. 
II. The Roberts Court: The First Four Terms 
A. General Observations on the Environmental Law Cases 
 During its first four terms, the Roberts Court decided fourteen “en-
vironmental law” cases.87 While it is dangerous to reach conclusions 
based on such a small sample, some preliminary observations can be 
made about the Court’s decisions. Consistent with recent history prior 
to the Roberts Court, most of the “environmental law” cases decided by 
the Roberts Court (seventy-one percent) involved statutory interpreta-
tion, as opposed to constitutional law or other issues.88 Similarly, seventy-
one percent of the Court’s decisions reversed lower court decisions, and 
the Court reversed all six of the cases that it reviewed from the Ninth 
Circuit.89 While this could be interpreted as consistent with Professor 
Albert Lin’s charge that the Supreme Court is often skeptical towards 
                                                                                                                      
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 972–73. Professor Adler implies, though, that the Court might be less deferen-
tial to the government once it begins to review environmental decisions made by, or sup-
ported by, President Obama’s Administration. See id. at 975. 
87 Infra app. A. While it is difficult to define the contours of what constitutes “envi-
ronmental law,” for purposes of this Article, the universe was limited to cases involving 
disputes arising under environmental statutes, and cases that directly raised issues that are 
central to environmental law in the context of environmental disputes, including cases 
addressing the Dormant Commerce Clause, takings, and punitive damages. In addition to 
the cases examined in this Article, during the prior four terms, the Roberts Court decided 
five cases that involved environment or natural resources agencies or were otherwise tan-
gentially related to environmental law. See generally Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 
(2009); New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597 (2008); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 
549 U.S. 457 (2007); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); BP America Prod. Co. v. Bur-
ton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006). Those five cases were not included in the statistical analyses in this 
Article. 
88 See infra app. A. Ten of the fourteen cases involved statutory interpretation. 
89 See infra app. A. 
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lower court rulings favorable to environmentalists,90 the Court’s reversal 
rate in environmental cases is similar to its reversal rate for all cases that 
it decided over the prior four terms.91 
 On balance, while the Roberts Court cannot be characterized as 
overtly hostile to the environment, the Court’s decisions are generally 
more harmful than beneficial to the environment. Quantitatively, only 
forty-three percent of the Court’s decisions can be characterized as 
“pro-environment,”92 and environmental groups were on the losing 
side in seventy-one percent of the cases in which they participated.93 
 Looking beyond the numbers, the “anti-environment” decisions 
appear to be bigger losses for the environment than the “pro-environ-
ment” decisions are wins. In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conser-
vation Council, the Court exempted discharges of mining waste and po-
tentially many other categories of waste from technology-based pollu-
tion controls under the Clean Water Act.94 In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 
Inc., the Court allowed the Environmental Protection Agency to con-
sider costs in setting pollution control standards under the Clean Water 
Act, although the statute did not explicitly allow the agency to consider 
costs, perhaps foreshadowing the Court’s interpretation of other envi-
ronmental statutes to allow greater use of cost benefit analysis without 
explicit authorization.95 In Winter v. NRDC, the Court weakened prece-
dent that encouraged courts to issue injunctions to require compliance 
with procedural requirements of environmental laws.96 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Lin, supra note 3, at 570. 
91 The reversal rates for the Roberts Court for the prior 4 terms are: (1) 2008 term—
76.9%, see SCOTUSblog.com, Circuit Scorecard OT08, at 1 ( June 25, 2009), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/circuit1.pdf; (2) 2007 term—66%, see 
SCOTUSblog.com, End of Term Statistical Analysis—October Term 2007, at 1 ( June 26, 
2008), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/memo07.pdf; (3) 
2006 term—72%, see SCOTUSblog.com, SCOTUSBlog End of Term “Super Stat Pack” —
OT06, at 2 ( June 28, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStat 
Pack.pdf; and (4) 2005 term—72%, see SCOTUSblog.com, SCOTUSBlog Circuit Chart—
October 2005 Term 1, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CircuitsFinal. 
pdf (last visited May 14, 2010). 
92 See infra app. A. 
93 Environmental groups were on the losing side in Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009), Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 
(2009), Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009), Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 
365 (2008), and National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007), 
while prevailing in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) and Environmental Defense v. 
Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007). 
94 See 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2465–66, 2474–76 (2009). 
95 See 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1508–09 (2009). 
96 See 129 S. Ct. 365, 375–76 (2008). 
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Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Court limited standing for persons 
bringing challenges based on harm to procedural rights.97 In Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, the Court reduced the 
scope of liable parties under the Superfund law and thereby reduced 
the funds available for Superfund cleanups in some cases.98 In Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court imposed limits on the amount of puni-
tive damages that can be awarded for pollution caused by oil spills un-
der maritime law.99 In National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wild-
life, the Court limited the scope of the duty of federal agencies to pro-
tect endangered species.100 Finally, contrary to predictions from several 
Justices in Rapanos v. United States,101 the Court’s decision in that case has 
resulted in a significant reduction in waters protected under the Clean 
Water Act.102 
 On the “pro-environment” side of the ledger, Massachusetts v. EPA 
was clearly a positive decision for the environment, as the Court deter-
mined that EPA acted unreasonably in justifying its failure to regulate 
greenhouse gases as air pollutants for purposes of provisions of the 
Clean Air Act regarding motor vehicle emissions.103 However, to the 
extent that the Court’s decision broadened standing principles, its 
reach is probably limited to lawsuits by States, as the Court already lim-
ited portions of the decision that addressed standing to protect proce-
dural rights in the Summers decision.104 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority was another positive environ-
mental decision, as the Court upheld, against a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge, a local “flow control” ordinance that required waste to be sent to 
government owned solid waste processing facilities.105 However, it is 
clear that the reach of the Court’s holding in that case is limited to 
                                                                                                                      
97 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009). 
98 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879–80 (2009). 
99 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008). 
100 551 U.S. 644, 671–72 (2007). 
101 547 U.S. 715, 742–45 (2006). 
102 A recent report from the EPA’s Office of Inspector General noted that almost 500 en-
forcement cases have been affected by the decision, “such that . . . enforcement was not pur-
sued as a result of jurisdictional uncertainty, case priority was lowered as a result of jurisdic-
tional uncertainty, or lack of jurisdiction” was raised as a defense in the enforcement action 
due to the Rapanos decision. Office of Inspector Gen., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Rep. No. 09-
N-0149, Congressionally Requested Report on Comments Related to Effects of Ju-
risdictional Uncertainty on Clean Water Act Implementation 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/20090430-09-N-0149.pdf. 
103 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007). 
104 See 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009). 
105 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007). 
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publicly owned facilities.106 Most of the other “pro-environment” deci-
sions of the Roberts Court are fairly limited, technical decisions that are 
unlikely to have broader impact beyond their facts.107 
 It is also significant that the Roberts Court issued “anti-environ-
ment” decisions in sixty percent of the cases involving constitutional law 
or common law issues,108 but issued “pro-environment” decisions in cas-
es involving statutory interpretation as often as it issued “anti-environ-
ment” decisions.109 As Professor Adler pointed out in analyzing whether 
the Roberts Court is “pro-business”, the Court’s rulings in cases involv-
ing constitutional or common law issues may be more significant in de-
fining the Court as “pro-environment” or “anti-environment” because, 
unlike the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions, those rulings can-
not be overridden by Congress.110 
 While it is difficult to classify the Roberts Court as “anti-environ-
ment” or “pro-environment” based on the small sample of environ-
mental cases decided so far, there does seem to be a clear “pro-govern-
ment” trend in the Court’s environmental decisions. In more than two-
thirds of the decisions, the Court ruled in favor of the position advo-
cated by the federal government or a state or local government.111 This 
                                                                                                                      
106 Id. 
107 In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, the Court held that there was no im-
plied “equitable tolling” exception to the statute of limitations for takings claims brought 
in the Court of Federal Claims. 552 U.S. 130, 136 (2008). In United States v. Atlantic Research 
Corp., the Court held that liable parties can sue other liable parties under section 107 of 
the Superfund law to recover costs that they have incurred in cleaning up releases of haz-
ardous substances. 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007). In S.D. Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental 
Protection, the Court concluded that discharges from a dam triggered the state review and 
approval procedures of section 401 of the Clean Water Act. 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006). Fi-
nally, in Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., the Court upheld air quality standards 
adopted by EPA that applied to modifications of stationary sources. 549 U.S. 561, 566 
(2007). 
108 See infra app. A. 
109 See infra app. A. 
110 See Adler, supra note 78, at 950. 
111 The cases where the Court ruled in favor of a position advocated by a governmental 
entity are: Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2474–
76 (2009) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 
1508–09 (2009) (EPA); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (For-
est Service); John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 136 (EPA); Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 
365, 375–76 (2008) (U.S. Navy); Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. at 566 (EPA); National Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 671–72 (2007) (EPA); United Haulers 
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007) (Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Authority); and S.D. Warren, Co., 547 U.S. at 375–87 (Maine Board 
of Environmental Protection). The cases where the Court ruled against a position advo-
cated by a governmental entity are: Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United 
States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1879–80 (2009) (United States); United States v. Atlantic Research 
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appears consistent with a more general trend, explored by the author of 
this Article in an earlier article, of the Roberts Court to accord greater 
deference to agencies.112 Professor Adler, in his exploration of the Rob-
erts Court’s environmental decisions, suggested that the Court’s pro-
government decision-making results from deference to other branches 
of government and narrow statutory interpretation.113 
B. Federalism, Chevron, and Textualism 
 Instead of focusing on whether the Roberts Court can be charac-
terized as “anti-environment” or “pro-government,” it may be more use-
ful to examine three significant factors that seem to be significantly im-
pacting the Roberts Court’s rulings in environmental law cases thus far: 
federalism, Chevron deference, and textualism. 
1. Federalism 
 In the environmental cases where federalism issues have been im-
plicated, the Roberts Court has ruled in favor of the interests of States 
and local governments in every case.114 In some cases, this yielded a 
“pro-environment” ruling, while in others, it yielded an “anti-environ-
ment” ruling. Rather than opportunistically and unevenly applying fe-
deralism principles to achieve “anti-environment” results, as Professor 
Lin suggested the Rehnquist Court was doing during the 2003 term,115 
the Roberts Court appears to be applying federalism principles vigor-
ously and consistently, regardless of whether the application yields “pro-
environment” or “anti-environment” results. 
 For instance, in S.D. Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental Protec-
tion, the Court reviewed whether operating a dam results in a “dis-
charge” under the Clean Water Act that triggers a process where States 
can review and impose conditions on the discharge to meet state water 
                                                                                                                      
Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007) (United States); and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 
739 (2006) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 
(2007), the Court ruled in favor of states, but against the federal government. The final 
case, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611–12 (2008), did not involve govern-
ment litigants. While the “pro-environment” voting records of the Justices are quite polar-
ized, the “pro-government” voting records of the Justices are clustered more closely to-
gether. See infra notes 203–07 and accompanying text; app. B. 
112 See Johnson, supra note 11, at 2. 
113 See Adler, supra note 78, at 951. 
114 See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742–45; S.D. Warren, 547 
U.S. at 386–87. 
115 See Lin, supra note 3, at 569, 619. 
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pollution standards.116 While the Court found that the operation of the 
dam results in “discharge” under the plain meaning of the term, it also 
discussed the purpose of the law and stressed that: 
[c]hanges in the river like these fall within a State’s legitimate 
legislative business, and the Clean Water Act provides for a sys-
tem that respects the States’ concerns . . . . State certifications 
under [section] 401 are essential in the scheme to preserve 
state authority to address the broad range of pollution 
. . . . Reading section 401 to give “discharge” its common and 
ordinary meaning preserves the state authority apparently in-
tended.117 
 Similarly, in United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Manage-
ment Authority, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an ordinance 
that required persons who collected waste within Oneida and Herkimer 
Counties in New York State to deliver the waste to a processing facility 
operated by the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Author-
ity.118 In upholding the constitutionality of the scheme against a Com-
merce Clause challenge, a plurality of the Court distinguished the case 
from a prior decision where the Court had struck down a similar flow 
control ordinance.119 The plurality stressed that the case at bar was dif-
ferent from the precedent case because the facility to which the waste 
was directed was a state-created public benefit corporation.120 The plu-
rality stressed that: 
“[c]ompelling reasons justify treating these laws differently 
from laws favoring particular private businesses over their 
competitors. . . . States and municipalities are not private busi-
nesses—far from it. Unlike private enterprise, government is 
vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, 
and welfare of its citizens. . . . These important responsibilities 
set state and local government apart from a typical private 
business. . . . Given these differences, it does not make sense to 
regard laws favoring local government and laws favoring pri-
vate industry with equal skepticism.”121 
                                                                                                                      
116 547 U.S. at 373. 
117 Id. at 386–87. 
118 550 U.S. at 334. 
119 Id. at 340–41. 
120 Id. at 340. 
121 Id. at 342–43. 
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Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions to criti-
cize the general concept of the Dormant Commerce Clause and to ad-
vocate for greater state authority.122 
 While federalism concerns helped spur “pro-environment” deci-
sions in S.D. Warren and United Haulers, they spurred an “anti-environ-
ment” decision in Rapanos v. United States.123 In Rapanos, the Court re-
viewed whether certain non-navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to 
“traditional navigable waters” were regulated under the Clean Water 
Act.124 In voting to limit the reach of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, the 
plurality first noted that the purposes of the Act include preserving the 
primary responsibility of States “to prevent, reduce and eliminate [wa-
ter] pollution.”125 The plurality then found that the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers interpretation of the statute to regulate all non-navigable tri-
butaries of waters of the United States and adjacent wetlands would “re-
sult in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary 
power over land and water use.”126 In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy argued that the scope of jurisdiction should be tied to the 
“significant nexus” test created by the Court in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,127 a case where the 
Court interpreted the Clean Water Act narrowly in order to avoid inter-
fering with traditional State power over land and water use.128 
 Even in cases where federalism concerns were not directly raised, 
but States were advocates, the Roberts Court frequently ruled in favor 
of the States. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for instance, the Court created 
generous standing rules for States, which it stressed are not “normal 
litigants,” and concluded that Massachusetts had standing to sue be-
cause its risk of injury would be reduced “to some extent” by the relief 
it sought.129 Similarly, the State of Alaska was a petitioner in Coeur 
Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, and the Court ruled in its 
favor, finding that the disposal of mining waste in Lower Slate Lake did 
not need to comply with pollution standards under section 402 of the 
                                                                                                                      
122 See id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
123 See generally United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine 
Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006). 
124 547 U.S. at 729–30. 
125 Id. at 737. 
126 Id. at 737–38 (citations omitted). 
127 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001). 
128 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 766–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
129 549 U.S. 497, 518, 526 (2007). 
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Clean Water Act.130 However, in Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, the 
Court rejected a challenge brought by States to EPA’s regulations that 
imposed pollution limits for cooling water intake structures based on 
cost considerations.131 
2. Chevron 
 Just as federalism has been an important factor that has influenced 
the Court’s decisionmaking in environmental law cases, Chevron defer-
ence has also been an important factor in many of the cases involving 
statutory interpretation,132 but Chevron deference has contributed to 
generally “anti-environment” decisions. In a sample of recent environ-
mental law cases where Chevron applied, the Roberts Court upheld the 
agencies’ interpretation of the statute in sixty percent of the cases.133 In 
all of the cases where the Court upheld the agencies’ interpretation of 
the statute, the Court’s decision was harmful, rather than beneficial, to 
the environment.134 
 One thing that is interesting about the Roberts Court’s application 
of Chevron to these environmental law cases is that the Court has gener-
                                                                                                                      
130 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2474 (2009). 
131 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1510 (2009). 
132 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC established a two-part test for courts to use when review-
ing legislative rules and other agency actions. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). At step one, if 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, courts should give effect to 
Congress’s intent. Id. At step two, though, if the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the 
question at issue, courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of the statute. Id. 
133 Five cases—Coeur Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. at 2469; 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1515; National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665–66 (2007); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527; and Rapanos, 
547 U.S. at 739—involved Chevron deference. The Court deferred to the agency’s interpre-
tation in three of the five cases—Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2474, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1515, 
and National Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 665–66—all of which were “anti-environ-
ment” decisions. The Court did not defer to the agency’s interpretation in the other two 
cases, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 529 (pro-environment) and Rapanos 547 U.S. at 739 
(anti-environment). While the plurality in Rapanos did not apply Chevron, the dissenters 
and Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, applied Chevron. 547 U.S. at 766 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the Court used a method of 
analysis that appears to be the Chevron analysis in the Duke Energy case, the Court did not 
cite Chevron in that case or discuss the two steps of the analysis in the case. See 549 U.S. 561, 
578–82 (2007). 
134 See Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2474 (exempting discharges of mining waste from 
technology based standards that would apply to permits issued under section 402 of the 
Clean Water Act); Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1510 (authorizing the consideration of cost benefit 
analysis in setting standards for cooling water intake structures); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Build-
ers, 551 U.S. at 665–67 (holding that EPA need not comply with section 7(a)(2) of the En-
dangered Species Act when delegating authority to the State of Alaska to issue water pollu-
tion permits). 
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ally resolved the statutory interpretation question at step two of Chev-
ron, rather than at step one. All of the Court’s “anti-environment” Chev-
ron decisions have been resolved at step two, rather than step one.135 
For instance, in Coeur Alaska, the majority determined that Congress 
did not directly speak to the precise question of whether EPA’s pollu-
tion standards under section 306 of the Clean Water Act applied to fill 
material, so the Court deferred to the agency’s determination that the 
standards did not apply.136 Similarly, in the Entergy decision, the major-
ity inverted the Chevron analysis and did not directly address whether 
the statute was ambiguous, but concluded that EPA acted reasonably in 
interpreting the Clean Water Act to authorize the consideration of costs 
in setting technology-based pollution control standards for cooling wa-
ter intake structures.137 Finally, in the National Ass’n of Home Builders 
case, the majority determined that the conflict between the provisions 
of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act rendered the 
provision in the Clean Water Act regarding delegation of federal water 
pollution permitting authority to States ambiguous.138 Moving to step 
two, the Court upheld EPA’s decision that it was not necessary to con-
sider the requirements of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species 
Act when deciding whether to approve delegation of the permitting 
program as reasonable.139 
 While this is admittedly a very small sample, it is interesting to note 
that the Roberts Court’s approach in those cases runs counter to a trend 
suggested by academics in the mid-1990’s, when many commentators 
were convinced that judges were less likely to find statutes ambiguous at 
step one because judges were increasingly adopting a textualist ap-
proach to statutory interpretation.140 Under Chevron, if a statute is not 
ambiguous, there is no need to defer to the agency’s interpretation of 
                                                                                                                      
135 See Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2474; Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1510; Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders, 551 U.S. at 665–66. The final “anti-environment” Chevron case was also decided at 
step two, by all of the Justices who applied Chevron. The dissenting Justices and Justice 
Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, all found the Clean Water Act ambiguous, but the 
dissenting Justices would have deferred to the agency, while Justice Kennedy did not; the 
plurality in Rapanos did not apply Chevron. 547 U.S. at 739, 766, 788. 
136 129 S. Ct. at 2469–74. 
137 129 S. Ct. at 1505–10. 
138 551 U.S. at 666–68. 
139 Id. 
140 See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and 
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 656, 681–82 (2000). 
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the statute.141 Thus, in Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Court owed 
no deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.142 
 While the Court did not defer to EPA in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
Roberts Court’s Chevron decisions generally accord broad deference to 
agencies. In Entergy, for instance, the majority of the Court indicated 
that it was appropriate to defer to EPA’s regulatory interpretation of 
the Clean Water Act to authorize the consideration of costs in setting 
technology-based pollution standards because the agency had consis-
tently provided guidance over several decades suggesting that costs 
could be considered in setting pollution control standards for cooling 
water intake structures on a case-by-case basis.143 However, as Justice 
Breyer noted in dissent, it appeared that the agency considered costs in 
its regulation in a manner that was different from the approach it had 
traditionally used. Therefore, the Court should not have deferred to 
the “traditional” interpretation of the statute—at least without some 
explanation for the change in interpretation—since the traditional in-
terpretation may have been a different interpretation than the one ad-
vanced by the agency in its regulation.144 
 Coeur Alaska is another case where the Court accorded the EPA 
exceedingly broad discretion.145 When the majority discussed whether 
the pollution standards under section 306 of the Clean Water Act ap-
plied to the discharge of fill material, the Court recognized that not 
only was the statute ambiguous, but the agency’s regulation was also 
ambiguous.146 Accordingly, pursuant to Auer v. Robbins, which holds that 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations,147 the 
Court in Coeur Alaska deferred to a memorandum that was sent from 
EPA’s headquarters to its regional office indicating that the pollution 
standards should not be applied to the discharge of fill material into 
Lower Slate Lake.148 Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence to 
stress that while he agreed that the Court should defer to the agency’s 
interpretation, the Court was applying Auer in a situation where the 
case should not apply.149 Scalia wrote that “it becomes obvious . . . that 
                                                                                                                      
141 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
142 549 U.S. 497, 528–32 (2007). 
143 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1509–10 (2009). 
144 Id. at 1515–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
145 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2471–72 (2009). 
146 Id. 
147 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
148 129 S. Ct. at 2476. 
149 Id. at 2479 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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the referenced ‘regulatory scheme,’ and ‘regulatory regime’ for which 
the Court accepts the agency interpretation includes not just the agen-
cies’ own regulations but also (and indeed primarily) the conformity of 
those regulations with the ambiguous governing statute, which is the 
primary dispute here.”150 He argued that the Court was according Chev-
ron deference or its equivalent to informal agency guidance, which is 
not owed Chevron deference pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Mead.151 
 The Court’s reasoning in Coeur Alaska also seems to be at odds with 
the reasoning adopted by the Court in 2006 in Gonzales v. Oregon.152 
The Gonzales Court created an exception to Auer, holding that the 
Court does not accord such deference to an agency interpretation 
when the agency is interpreting a regulation that merely restates or pa-
raphrases the statutory language.153 The Court stressed that “the ques-
tion here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the 
statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its 
own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to for-
mulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory 
language.”154 As Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion stressed, the Coeur 
Alaska majority appeared to be giving deference to the agency’s inter-
pretation of the statute, rather than the regulation.155 
 To the extent that Coeur Alaska broadens the deference owed to 
agencies under Auer v. Robbins, it continues a trend begun by the Rob-
erts Court in the 2006 term in Home Builders and a case that did not in-
volve environmental law, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke.156 In 
both of those cases, the Court accorded Auer deference to agency in-
terpretations of regulations when the interpretations had changed over 
time,157 while the Court’s precedent in Gonzales v. Oregon implied that 
Auer deference should not be accorded to agency interpretations that 
change over time.158 
                                                                                                                      
150 Id. 
151 Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)). Justice Scalia wrote 
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152 See 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
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155 Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2479 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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157 See id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662–63 
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 Although the Roberts Court has accorded significant deference to 
agencies in the environmental law cases involving Chevron thus far, it is 
unclear whether the Court will accord the same level of deference to 
decisions made by agencies under a new presidential administration. 
Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein, among others, have sug-
gested that the decisionmaking of Supreme Court Justices and lower 
federal court judges can be motivated by political ideology.159 Profes-
sors Miles and Sunstein reviewed the decisionmaking of Supreme 
Court Justices and federal appellate court judges in Chevron cases (prior 
to the ascension of Chief Justice Roberts to the Supreme Court) to de-
termine whether application of the test reduced judicial policymak-
ing.160 In theory, the two-step analysis should eliminate systematic dif-
ferences in decisionmaking among judges along political lines, so that 
the rate at which judges validate agency actions should be fairly uni-
form and not correlated to the ideology of the judges.161 However, in 
reviewing the decisionmaking of Supreme Court Justices, Professors 
Miles and Sunstein found that the validation rates for Justices varied by 
almost thirty percentage points across the Justices.162 Justice Breyer va-
lidated agency decisions in 81.8% of the Chevron cases in the study, 
while Justice Thomas validated agency decisions in only 52.2% of the 
cases.163 The divergence identified in Professor Miles and Sunstein’s 
study is also apparent in the limited sample of Chevron cases decided by 
the Roberts Court, where Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens only 
voted to uphold the agencies’ decisions in one of five cases, while Jus-
tices Alito, Scalia, Roberts and Thomas voted to uphold the agencies’ 
decisions in four of five cases.164 
 More importantly, at the Supreme Court level, Miles and Sunstein 
found that political ideology played an important role in decisionmak-
ing.165 Significantly, they concluded that (1) “liberal” Justices166 voted to 
                                                                                                                      
159 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
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validate agency decisions more often than “conservative” Justices in 
general;167 (2) the rate at which the Justices validated agency decisions 
seemed to be significantly influenced by whether the agency interpreta-
tion was “liberal” or “conservative;”168 and (3) the rate at which the Jus-
tices validated agency decisions seemed to be significantly influenced 
by the political party of the administration whose decisions were being 
reviewed.169 Miles and Sunstein concluded that “the most conservative 
members of the Supreme Court show significantly increased validation 
of agency interpretations after President Bush succeeded President 
Clinton . . . .”170 Time will tell whether a change in administration re-
sults in a change in deference. 
3. Textualism 
 While the application of Chevron and deference to agencies has 
been contributing to “anti-environment” decisions in the Roberts Court 
thus far, the same cannot be said for textualism. In contrast to Professor 
Lin’s observations that the Rehnquist Court, during the 2003 term, ap-
peared to be relying on textualism to interpret environmental statutes 
against their purposes,171 textualism has not played a central role in the 
“anti-environment” decisions of the Roberts Court.172 
 As noted in the preceding section, in most of the “anti-environ-
ment” Chevron cases, the Roberts Court has relied on Chevron step two 
                                                                                                                      
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor were not labeled as “liberal” or “conservative,” and the 
study did not examine voting records of Justices Roberts or Alito). 
167 Id. at 823, 826, 832. 
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sions less frequently when they reviewed decisions of a republican administration than a 
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the change in validation rates for the most “conservative” Justices. Id. at 826. Miles and 
Sunstein noted that “the validation rates of the conservative Justices appear more sensitive 
to the presidential administration.” Id. at 833. 
171 Lin, supra note 3, at 568. 
172 See supra Part II.B.2; infra Part III. 
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rather than an interpretation of the statute according to its plain mean-
ing at step one.173 In fact, in only one of the ten cases involving statu-
tory interpretation did the Court adopt a plain meaning interpretation 
of the statute that was detrimental to the environment.174 
 It is significant that most of the “anti-environment” decisions have 
not been based on textualism, because the Supreme Court has limited 
the discretion of agencies to change their interpretations of statutes 
after the Court has concluded that the statute is unambiguous.175 Thus, 
if the agencies want to reverse the positions that they have taken in the 
“anti-environment” cases under a new administration, they would have 
discretion to do that, so long as the explanation for the change is rea-
sonable.176 
 While most of the “anti-environment” decisions have not been 
based on textualism, the Roberts Court has reached many of its “pro 
environment” decisions through the plain meaning approach. The 
Court’s textualist approach in Massachusetts v. EPA was described in the 
preceding section.177 In addition, in S.D. Warren v. Maine Board of Envi-
ronmental Protection, the majority determined that the ordinary meaning 
of “discharge,” under the Webster’s New International Dictionary, includes 
releases of water from a dam, so that the operation of the dam triggers 
the state review and certification procedures of the Clean Water Act.178 
Similarly, in United States v. Atlantic Research, the Court concluded that 
the plain meaning of section 107 of the Superfund law authorized li-
able parties to sue other liable parties to recover money that they had 
spent to clean up hazardous substance spills.179 
III. Revisiting the Critiques of Professors Farber and Lazarus 
 Throughout this article, reference has been made to the “envi-
ronmental law” cases of the Roberts Court. It seems appropriate at this 
                                                                                                                      
173 See supra Part II.B.2. 
174 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1878–79 
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time, therefore, to revisit the observations that were made by Professors 
Farber and Lazarus and inquire whether “environmental law” is becom-
ing a unique area of law in the Roberts Court. 
A. Revisiting Professor Farber 
 In his review of the Supreme Court’s environmental jurisprudence 
a decade ago, Professor Farber asserted that the Supreme Court had 
minimized its influence on the development of environmental law in 
several important ways: (1) by choosing to hear cases that have little 
precedential value because they involve insignificant issues or have pe-
culiar facts; (2) by dismissing many cases on jurisdictional grounds and 
avoiding deciding cases on the merits; and (3) by resolving issues on 
narrow, technical grounds or deferring to agency decisions when the 
Court addresses the merits in environmental cases.180 A review of the 
environmental cases decided during the Roberts era suggests that some 
change has occurred, but not much. 
 As in the past, many of the Court’s environmental cases involved 
peculiar facts or could have limited precedential value. For instance, 
the Winter Court focused heavily on the importance of military readi-
ness in its opinion,181 so the decision might be limited to disputes aris-
ing in similar contexts in the future. Similarly, the limitation on puni-
tive damages in Exxon Shipping v. Baker could be limited to cases arising 
under maritime law.182 At the same time, though, the Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA does not qualify as a case involving peculiar facts 
with limited precedential value.183 Likewise, in Burlington Northern and 
Sante Fe Railway v. United States, the Court addressed some aspects of the 
CERCLA contribution puzzle,184 which Farber chastised the Court gen-
erally for ignoring.185 
 Regarding the Court’s preference for dismissing cases on jurisdic-
tional grounds, the Court adopted that approach in Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing,186 and in John 
R. Sand & Gravel v. United States, finding that the statute of limitations 
barred the plaintiffs’ suit.187 However, the Court declined an opportu-
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nity to dismiss the Massachusetts v. EPA case on standing grounds,188 and 
most of the environmental cases that were heard by the Roberts Court 
were decided on the merits. 
 Regarding the Court’s preference to defer to agencies and to de-
cide cases on narrow, technical grounds, the trend noted by Professor 
Farber continues in the Roberts Court. As described in the prior section 
of this Article, the Court has frequently deferred to agencies in envi-
ronmental cases under Chevron.189 Furthermore, several of the Court’s 
decisions have been based on narrow, technical grounds. In addition to 
Winter and Exxon, which are mentioned above, the Court issued a nar-
row decision in United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management 
Authority, likely limiting its reach to cases involving state-created public 
benefits corporations.190 Even in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court left 
open the possibility that EPA could re-examine its decision and deter-
mine that it was not appropriate to regulate automobile emissions of 
carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act.191 
B. Revisiting Professor Lazarus 
 As noted above, Professor Lazarus bases his conclusion that the 
Court has been indifferent, or even hostile, towards environmental law, 
on a review of the voting patterns of Justices in environmental cases, the 
identity of Justices writing opinions in environmental cases, and the na-
ture of those opinions. As some evidence of environmental law’s stand-
ing with the Court, he noted that the Justice who wrote the greatest 
number of opinions in environmental cases did not write with an envi-
ronmental voice or passion and that the Justice who most frequently 
voted in the majority in environmental cases rarely wrote majority opin-
ions.192 Similar patterns exist in the Roberts Court. Justice David Souter 
wrote the most majority opinions in environmental cases during the 
Roberts term, but his opinions were quite dry and technical, with no 
environmental rhetoric and little discussion about the purposes or goals 
of the environmental laws.193 As in the past, Justice Kennedy continues 
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to vote in the majority in the greatest number of environmental cases, 
but he has written only one majority opinion out of the fourteen cas-
es.194 The Justice who voted in favor of the “pro-environment” position 
most often, Justice Ginsburg,195 did not author any majority opinions.196 
 While most of the majority opinions in environmental cases con-
tinue to lack strong environmental rhetoric or focus on the goals and 
purposes of environmental law, the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA was an exception and pro- and anti-environmental rhetoric is in-
creasing in several dissenting and concurring opinions. In expanding 
standing principles for States in Massachusetts v. EPA, the majority spoke 
passionately about the harms that would be caused by emissions of 
greenhouse gases, including the retreat of glaciers and global sea level 
rise, the need to regulate motor vehicle emissions of carbon dioxide,197 
and the real risk of “catastrophic harm” that will be caused by such 
emissions.198 Counterbalancing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia 
wrote a strong dissent expressing skepticism about the “asserted” harms 
caused by greenhouse gases and chiding the majority for adopting a 
definition of air pollutant broad enough to include “everything air-
borne, from Frisbees to flatulence.”199 
 Justice Scalia also expressed strong “anti-environment” sentiments 
in his plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, describing the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers as “an enlightened despot” and criticizing the 
Corps for interpreting the Clean Water Act in a manner that Scalia ar-
gued authorized regulating “entire cities and immense arid wastelands” 
as waters of the United States, stretching the term “beyond parody.”200 
 To the extent that an environmental voice emerged in other cases 
during the Roberts Term, though, it generally appeared in the “anti-
environment” cases in dissent. In his dissenting opinion in National 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Stevens spoke about 
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the goal of the Endangered Species Act to make species protection the 
“highest of priorities” without exception and he lamented that the ma-
jority’s opinion “whittles away at Congress’ comprehensive effort to 
protect endangered species from the risk of extinction and fails to give 
the Act its intended effect.”201 Towards the end of the opinion, Justice 
Stevens wrote: 
Mindful that judges must always remain faithful to the intent 
of the legislature, Chief Justice Burger closed his opinion in 
the “snail darter” case with a reminder that “[o]nce the mean-
ing of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality de-
termined, the judicial process comes to an end.” Hill, 437 U. 
S., at 194. This Court offered a definitive interpretation of the 
Endangered Species Act nearly 30 years ago in that very case. 
Today the Court turns its back on our decision in Hill and 
places a great number of endangered species in jeopardy, in-
cluding the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl and Pima pineap-
ple cactus at issue here. At the risk of plagiarizing Chief Jus-
tice Burger’s fine opinion, I think it is appropriate to end my 
opinion just as he did—with a quotation attributed to Sir 
Thomas More that has as much relevance today as it did three 
decades ago. This quotation illustrates not only the funda-
mental character of the rule of law embodied in § 7 of the 
ESA but also the pernicious consequences of official disobe-
dience of such a rule. Repetition of that literary allusion is es-
pecially appropriate today: 
 “The law, Roper, the law. I know what’s legal, not what’s 
right. And I’ll stick to what’s legal. . . . I’m not God. The cur-
rents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such 
plain-sailing, I can’t navigate, I’m no voyager. But in the thick-
ets of the law, oh there I’m a forester. . . . What would you do? 
Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil? . . . 
And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round 
on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? 
. . . This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to 
coast—Man’s laws, not God’s—and if you cut them down . . . 
d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that 
would blow then? . . . Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for 
my own safety’s sake.” R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, 
                                                                                                                      
201 551 U.S. 664, 674–75 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
2010] The Roberts Court and the Environment 347 
p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed., 1967) (quoted in Hill, 
437 U. S., at 195).”202 
 Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinions in Winter v. NRDC 203 and 
Coeur Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council 204 also demonstrate 
a strong environmental voice. In Coeur Alaska, she wrote at length about 
the purposes and goals of the Clean Water Act, citing legislative history 
that suggests that the use of the waters as a waste treatment system is 
unacceptable, and she chastised the majority for reading the statute to 
allow polluters to transform waters of the United States into waste dis-
posal facilities.205 She argued that “[p]roviding an escape hatch for pol-
luters whose discharges contain solid matter . . . is particularly per-
verse” and criticized EPA for failing to exercise its authority to veto a 
permit for the fill in the case, which would cause “[d]estruction of 
nearly all aquatic life in a pristine lake.”206 In Winter, she wrote about 
NEPA’s “‘sweeping commitment’ to environmental integrity”207 and the 
need to integrate environmental concerns “into the very process of 
agency decisionmaking” and “into the fabric of agency planning.”208 In 
light of the goals of NEPA to afford the public and other agencies with 
information and an opportunity to comment, she wrote about the need 
to prepare an EIS at the “earliest possible time” to advance the infor-
mation and participatory goals of NEPA.209 She described the harms 
that would be caused by the Navy’s use of sonar in great detail and ar-
gued that the risks “cannot be lightly dismissed, even in the face of an 
alleged risk to the effectiveness of the Navy’s 14 training exercises.”210 
 Neither Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Burlington Northern v. United 
States nor Justice Stevens’s dissent in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper contain 
passionate rhetoric, but both focus on the goals and purposes of the 
environmental laws at issue in the case. Other than Justices Ginsburg, 
Stevens, and Scalia, though, none of the Justices make strong state-
ments in favor of, or opposed to, protection of the environment in 
their opinions. Justice Breyer repeatedly writes concurring and dissent-
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ing opinions to clarify administrative law issues, suggesting that he 
probably views environmental law simply as administrative law that aris-
es in disputes involving the environment.211 
 In addition to reviewing the nature of the opinions written by Su-
preme Court Justices, Professor Lazarus examined the voting records of 
the Justices in an attempt to determine whether any of the Justices ap-
peared to be influenced, in their decisionmaking, by the environmental 
nature of a case.212 A review of the voting patterns of Justices in the Ro-
berts Court in the environmental cases suggests that several Justices 
may be influenced by the environmental nature of the cases and that 
the Court may be becoming even more polarized on those issues than 
in the past.213 
 First, it is interesting to note that Justice Stevens and Ginsburg vote 
in the majority on environmental cases far less frequently than they 
vote in the majority in other cases decided during the Roberts era.214 
While Justice Ginsburg has voted in the majority between sixty-nine and 
seventy-five percent of the time in all cases, she has voted in the major-
ity only forty-three percent of the time in environmental cases.215 Simi-
larly, while Justice Stevens has voted in the majority between sixty-four 
and seventy-five percent of the time in all cases, he has also voted in the 
majority only forty-three percent of the time in environmental cases.216 
At the other end of the scale, Justices Thomas and Scalia voted in the 
majority in environmental cases decided during the Roberts era more 
frequently than they vote in the majority in other cases.217 
 Following up on the system created by Professor Lazarus,218 if the 
Justices are assigned EP scores for their voting records on environ-
mental cases decided during the Roberts era, it appears that many of 
                                                                                                                      
211 See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stressing that 
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the Justices are influenced by the environmental nature of cases, as most 
of the Justices have scores that are higher than sixty-six percent or lower 
than thirty-three percent,219 the numbers at which Professor Lazarus 
suggested a fair case could be made that the environmental dimension 
of the case influenced their decision.220 On the pro-environment side, 
four Justices, Ginsburg (93%), Souter (86%), Breyer (71%) and Stevens 
(71%) have pro-environment scores that are higher than 66%.221 The 
other five Justices, Alito (31%), Kennedy (36%), Roberts (36%), Scalia 
(36%), and Thomas (36%) all have scores close to thirty-three per-
cent.222 The scores also suggest that the Court may be becoming more 
polarized on environmental issues during the Roberts era. While there 
were no Justices with a score over sixty-six percent in Lazarus’ study 
through the 1999 Term of the Supreme Court,223 four Justices have 
scores over sixty-six percent during the Roberts era.224 While there were 
four Justices with scores of thirty-three percent or lower in Lazarus’ 
study,225 the remaining five Justices all have scores below or near thirty-
three percent.226 
 On the whole, therefore, most of the criticisms that Professor Laza-
rus leveled at the Supreme Court prior to the appointment of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts can be raised with similar force to the environmental deci-
sionmaking of the Roberts Court. The final section of this article briefly 
explores whether a recent change in the composition of the Court is 
likely to have any impact on the Court’s treatment of environmental law. 
IV. Replacing Justice Souter 
 While the composition of the Court had not changed since the 
appointment of Justice Alito during the first term of the Roberts Court, 
Justice David Souter retired at the conclusion of the October 2008 
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Term.227 On May 26, 2009, President Obama nominated Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, to replace Justice Souter on the Court.228 Judge Sotomayor 
has received the support of environmental groups,229 but her appoint-
ment will probably not significantly change the Roberts Court’s ap-
proach toward environmental cases. 
 Even if she ultimately votes in favor of “pro-environment” positions 
in environmental cases, she will merely be replacing another Justice 
who voted consistently in favor of “pro-environment” positions. Justice 
Souter’s EP scores in Professor Lazarus’ study230 and during the terms 
of the Roberts’ Court are among the highest on the Court231 and he 
wrote the most majority opinions in environmental cases during the 
Roberts Court’s first four terms.232 He was also a frequent dissenter in 
the Court’s “anti-environment” decisions.233 
 Although Judge Sotomayor’s appointment may not significantly 
change the nature of the Roberts Court’s treatment of environmental 
law, the limited data that is available suggest that she may be a strong 
environmental voice on the Court. While she has written very few opin-
ions in environmental cases on the Second Circuit, she authored that 
court’s opinion in the Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA case that was reversed by 
the Supreme Court.234 Applying Chevron, her opinion concluded, at 
step one, that the Clean Water Act did not authorize EPA to consider 
cost-benefit analysis in setting pollution standards for cooling water in-
take structures.235 Significantly, the analysis focused on the purposes of 
the statute and legislative history to clarify the language of the statute 
and did not adopt a textualist approach.236 Ultimately, though, the 
                                                                                                                      
227 See Dana Milbank, Mr. Smith Leaves Washington, Wash. Post, June 30, 2009, at A2. 
228 See Nomination Makes History, Augusta Chron., May 27, 2009, at A4. 
229 Alex Kaplun, Enviro Groups Like What They See in Obama’s Justice Pick, N.Y. Times, May 
27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/05/27/27greenwire-enviro-groups-like-what- 
they-see-in-obamas-just-6076.html. 
230 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 812 app. D. 
231 See infra app. B. 
232 See infra app. C. 
233 E.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2480 
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1516 
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1153 (2009) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365, 387 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 673 (2007) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 786 (2006) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
234 475 F.3d 83 (2nd Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Entergy Corp. 129 S. Ct. at 1498. 
235 Id. at 98–99. 
236 Id. at 97–101. 
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court concluded, at Chevron step two, that it was not possible to deter-
mine whether EPA had used cost-benefit analysis in setting the stan-
dards, so the court remanded to the agency to explain the manner in 
which it considered cost in setting the standards.237 
 She also joined in another decision in the Second Circuit where the 
court focused on legislative history and statutory purposes, rather than 
textualism, to interpret a statute to protect the environment. In NRDC v. 
Abraham, the court overturned the Department of Energy’s efforts to 
weaken energy efficiency standards for air conditioning units.238 Apply-
ing Chevron, the court concluded at step one that it was clear, based on 
the legislative history and purpose of the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act, that the agency did not have the authority under the statute to 
revoke energy efficiency standards that had been published as final 
standards, even though the attempted revocation preceded the “effec-
tive date” of the standards.239 
 On the “anti-environment” side of the ledger, Judge Sotomayor 
was part of a panel that rejected an environmental group’s challenge to 
EPA’s approval of New York’s plan for meeting the agency’s air quality 
standard for ozone in Environmental Defense v. EPA.240 Even in that case, 
though, the court examined the legislative history and purpose of the 
Clean Air Act to determine whether the agency’s decision complied 
with the statute.241 The court determined, at Chevron step one, that the 
statute was ambiguous regarding whether the scientific modeling used 
by New York was appropriate, and the Court concluded at step two that 
the agency’s interpretation of the statute to authorize the modeling 
used by New York was reasonable.242 The court stressed that in “exam-
ining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple find-
ings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferen-
tial.”243 Federalism considerations also seem to have motivated the 
court in this case, as the court emphasized that “the primary responsi-
bility for meeting these [air quality] standards rests with the states” and 
that “states have considerable leeway in selecting the particular meth-
                                                                                                                      
237 Id. at 102–05. 
238 355 F.3d 179, 206 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
239 Id. at 195–97. 
240 369 F.3d 193, 210–12 (2nd Cir. 2004). 
241 Id. at 196–98. 
242 Id. at 203–05. 
243 Id. at 204 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)). 
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ods and programs they will use to achieve compliance with the national 
standards.”244 
 Just as federalism considerations may have influenced the Second 
Circuit in the Environmental Defense case, federalism considerations in-
fluenced that court in another decision that Judge Sotomayor joined 
that rejected challenges brought by environmental plaintiffs. In Burnette 
v. Carothers, the court upheld the dismissal of citizen suits brought 
against Connecticut State officials under the Clean Water Act, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, on the grounds 
that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment immunity for 
States.245 
 Thus, Judge Sotomayor’s record in environmental cases seems 
generally positive and her votes against environmental groups have fre-
quently been motivated by federalism considerations. While the opin-
ions she has written or joined lack environmental rhetoric, they focus 
on legislative history and statutory purposes, rather than textualism, 
and are generally pro-environment, suggesting that her voting pattern 
on the Supreme Court may more closely follow Justices Ginsburg and 
Stevens than Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
Conclusion 
 While environmental law issues were a major focus of the Supreme 
Court during the October 2008 Term, very few environmental cases are 
on the Court’s docket for the current term.246 Accordingly, it may take 
time to assess Justice Sotomayor’s influence on the development of 
“environmental law” and on the outcome of environmental cases. Nev-
ertheless, even if she were to become a strong environmental voice on 
the Court, it will likely have little effect on the treatment of environ-
mental law by the Roberts Court. Although it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions based on the small number of environmental law cases de-
cided by the Roberts Court thus far, the Court’s decisions, on the 
whole, have generally been more harmful than beneficial to the envi-
                                                                                                                      
244 Id. at 197. 
245 192 F.3d 52, 55 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
246 The only case added to the Court’s docket for the October 2009 Term, at this time, 
is Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Florida. Department of Environmental Protection, a case 
that involves littoral rights and takings. The Oyez Project, Stop the Beach Renourishment 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, http://oyez.org/cases/2000-
2009/2009/2009_08_1151 (last visited May 14, 2010). 
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ronment.247 While the Roberts Court has not been overtly hostile to the 
environment, it appears that a majority of the Justices are negatively 
motivated by the environmental nature of those cases,248 and that bal-
ance has not shifted with Justice Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice 
Souter. Like its predecessors, the Roberts Court has not generally 
treated “environmental law” as a separate area of law. Based on the cur-
rent composition of the Court, though, that could be a good thing for 
the environment. 
                                                                                                                      
247 See supra notes 92–113 and accompanying text. 
248 See infra app. B. 
Appendices† 
Appendix A: Environmental Cases Decided During the October 2005–2008 Terms 
Case Major Issue Affirm/Reverse Pro-Environment 
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 
2458 (2009). 
Statutory Interpretation Reversed 9th 
Circuit 
No 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Company v. United 
States,129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
Statutory Interpretation  Reversed 9th 
Circuit  
No 
Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, 
129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). 
Statutory Interpretation  Reversed 2d 
Circuit  
No 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 
S. Ct. 1142 (2009). 
Standing Reversed 9th 
Circuit 
No 
Winter v. NRDC, 129 S. Ct. 365 
(2008).  
Appropriateness of injunction Reversed 9th 
Circuit 
No 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
† Sources: SCOTUSBlog, Frequency in the Majority OT08 ( June 29, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/fre- 
quency-in-the-majority.pdf; Memorandum from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. & SCOTUSBlog.com regarding End of Term Statistical Analy-
sis—October Term 2007, at 5 ( June 26, 2008), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/memo07.pdf; SCOTUSBlog, 
SCOTUSBlog End of Term “Super Stat Pack”—OT06, ( June 28, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStatPack.pdf; Georgetown 
Univ. Law Ctr., Supreme Court Inst., Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2005 Overview, 7 ( June 30, 2006), available at http://www.scotus 
blog.com/movabletype/archives/GULCSupCtInstituteFinalReportOT2005_30June06.pdf. 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. 
Ct. 2605 (2008). 
Punitive Damages Reversed 9th 
Circuit 
No 
John R. Sand and Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008). 
Statutory Interpretation  Affirmed Federal 
Circuit  
Yes 
National Association of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
551 U.S. 644 (2007).  
Statutory Interpretation  Reversed 9th 
Circuit  
No 
United States v. Atlantic Research 
Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). 
Statutory Interpretation  Affirmed 8th 
Circuit  
Yes 
United Haulers Association v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management 
Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007).  
Commerce Clause Affirmed 2d 
Circuit 
Yes 
Environmental Defense v. Duke 
Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).  
Statutory Interpretation  Reversed 4th 
Circuit  
Yes 
Massachusetts v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007). 





Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006). 




S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of 
Env’l Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006).  










Alito 4 - Atlantic Research; 
S.D. Warren; 




(did not participate 
in Exxon)  




John R. Sand & 
Gravel; 





Breyer 10 - Winter; 
Summers; 







John R. Sand & 
Gravel 
71% 7 - Entergy; 
Coeur Alaska; 
John R. Sand & 
Gravel; 
Duke Energy;  
United Haulers; 
Rapanos; 
S.D. Warren  
54% 
Ginsburg 13 - Winter; 
Summers;  























John R. Sand & 
Gravel  





















John R. Sand & 
Gravel  




John R. Sand & 
Gravel; 










John R. Sand & 
Gravel  




John R. Sand & 
Gravel; 






Souter 12 - Winter; 86% 5 - John R. Sand & 38% 
Summers; 
Entergy; 
Coeur Alaska;  
Mass. v. EPA;  
NAHB; 
Duke Energy;  








United Haulers;  
Rapanos; 
S.D. Warren  
Stevens 10 - Summers;  
Entergy; Coeur 
Alaska; Mass. v. 
EPA; NAHB; Duke 
Energy; Atlantic 
Research; Rapanos;
S.D. Warren;  
Exxon 
71% 3 - Winter; 
Duke Energy;  
Rapanos; 
S.D. Warren  
23% 
Thomas 5 - Duke Energy; 
Atlantic Research;  
United Haulers;   
S.D. Warren; 
John R. Sand & 
Gravel  
36% 10 - Winter; 
Summers;  
Entergy; Coeur 
Alaska; John R. 
Sand & Gravel; 








Appendix C: Environmental Opinions by Justice 
Justice Majority Opinions Concurring Opinions Dissenting Opinions 
Alito National Assoc. of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife 
None United Haulers v. Oneida 
Herkimer Solid Waste 
Authority 
Breyer John R. Sand & Gravel v. 
United States 
(1) Winter v. NRDC; 
(2) Entergy Corporation v. 
Riverkeeper; 
(3) Coeur Alaska v. Southeast 
Alaska Conservation Council; 
(4) Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 
(1) Winter v. NRDC; 
(2) Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute; 
(3) Entergy Corporation v. 
Riverkeeper; 
(4) Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker; 
(5) National Assoc. of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife   
Ginsburg None  Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (1) Winter v. NRDC; 
(2) Burlington Northern v. 
United States; 
(3) Coeur Alaska v. Southeast 
Alaska Conservation 
Council; 
(4) John R. Sand & Gravel v. 
United States; 
(5) Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker 
Kennedy Coeur Alaska v. Southeast 
Alaska Conservation 
Council 
(1) Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute; 
(2) Rapanos v. United States 
None 
Roberts (1) Winter v. NRDC; 
(2) United Haulers v. Oneida 
Herkimer Solid Waste 
Authority 
Rapanos v. United States Massachusetts v. EPA  
Scalia (1) Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute; 
(2) Entergy Corporation v. 
Riverkeeper 
 
Also authored plurality 
opinion in Rapanos v. 
United States 
(1) Coeur Alaska v. Southeast 
Alaska Conservation Council; 
(2) Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker; 
(3) United Haulers v. Oneida 
Herkimer Solid Waste 
Authority 
Massachusetts v. EPA  
Souter (1) Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker; 
(2) Environmental Defense 
v. Duke Energy; 
(3) S.D. Warren v. Maine 




Appendix C: Environmental Opinions by Justice (Continued) 
Justice Majority Opinions Concurring Opinions Dissenting Opinions 
Stevens (1) Burlington Northern v. 
United States; 
(2) Massachusetts v. EPA 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (1) Entergy Corporation v. 
Riverkeeper; 
(2) John R. Sand & Gravel v. 
United States; 
(3) Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker; 
(4) National Assoc. of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife; (5) Rapanos v. 
United States 
Thomas United States v. Atlantic 
Research 
(1) Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker; 
(2) Environmental Defense v. 
Duke Energy Corp.; 
(3) United Haulers v. Oneida 




 Appendix D: Justices’ Frequency in the Majority in Environmental Cases as Compared to All Types of 
Cases for the October 2005–2008 Terms 
















Alito 85% 81.0% 82% 86.1% 88.2% 
Breyer 68% 74.7% 79% 76% 76.8% 
Ginsburg 43% 69.6% 75% 72% 81.2% 
Kennedy 93% 92.4% 86% 97% 88.4% 
Roberts 93% 81.0% 90% 89% 92.4% 
Scalia 93% 83.5% 81% 81% 88.4% 
Souter 61% 68.4% 77% 78% 81.2% 
Stevens 43% 64.6% 75% 64% 73.9% 
Thomas 93% 81.0% 75% 78% 79.4% 
 
  
